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Chapter 4
New Confi guration or 





As energy prices in the early twenty-fi rst century approached fi gures last seen during 
the 1970s “oil shocks,” confrontation between developed consumer countries and 
less developed supplier countries gained renewed saliency. However, while optimists 
view price-related pressures leading to confl ict as cyclical and transitory, incapable 
of overwhelming larger North–South trade complementarities, others emphasize the 
stronger momentum of rising demand and declining supply trends, conjoined with 
asymmetrical Northern military power, in the direction of “resource wars.”
The optimistic case rests largely on the parallel logics of the “product cycle” and 
“obsolescing bargain” (Vernon 1971). As learning and technological diffusion lower 
barriers to entry and earlier expropriations have positive demonstration effects 
(Kobrin 1985), host governments seek to curtail multinational corporations’ (MNC) 
role in their commodity sectors. While the former concept implies that increased 
supply from developing countries’ national oil companies (NOCs) would lower 
prices, thereby reinforcing the need for MNCs’ marketing skills and limiting seizure 
of their “upstream” assets, countervailing demand pressures allowed NOCs to fi nd 
their own marketing outlets (Vernon 1977, 1980). Recent accounts point to how 
signal events, such as the 1982 Debt Crisis, tilted power back to MNCs, which have 
availed themselves of offi cial Northern institutions to guarantee FDI (foreign direct 
investment) prerogatives (Mommer 2002; Hildyard & Muttitt 2006; Holland 
2006a, 2006b). Thus, the post-2003 resurgence in “resource nationalism” seems 
anomalous.
Nonetheless, this depiction of North–South energy-centric confl ict omits the 
incentives of Northern governments, representing consumer majorities, to use more 
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coercion in countering supply manipulation and in preserving their economic lati-
tude to sanction particular Southern exporters. The “resource wars” argument holds 
that Northern countries, notably the United States, are deploying force to ensure 
access to stable lower-priced imports (Klare 2002; Rutledge 2005; Hallinan 2006), 
partially in anticipation of post-2005 “peaks” in global oil and gas output (Darley 
2004; Peters 2004; Deffeyes 2005). What remains puzzling, however, is that it was 
only after the 2003 Iraq War, thought by many to have been motivated by oil, that 
an incipient post-1998 seller’s market became full-blown, vesting greater economic 
power in Southern exporting states. Just as US counter-measures to the 1970s 
“energy crisis” were constrained, the probability of further “resource war” is 
reduced by US experiences in Iraq, leaving economic adjustment as the most viable 
alternative response.
This chapter elucidates general patterns and types of North–South energy trade 
confl ict pitting governments of less-developed host countries and their organizations 
against MNCs and major consumer-country governments. Based on the example of 
oil, it delineates the sociopolitical economy of the “energy trade cycle,” an ana-
lytical construct of a general oscillation between “buyers’ markets” and “sellers’ 
markets,” based not simply on the product cycle model, but also on realism, pros-
pect theory, and constructivism. Realism is consistent with the assumption that host 
governments have greater incentives to keep prices high than Northern consumers 
have to suppress them, such that sellers’ markets advantage “offensive” actions by 
Southern states (to alter the status quo), inclusive of sanctioning selected consumer 
countries, yet it also concedes a higher likelihood of Northern “counter-offensives” 
to restore corporate privileges and compel increased or stable supply. Conversely, 
prospect theory highlights the leverage inhering in actions intended to avert losses, 
suggesting that buyers’ markets favor “defensive” actions by consumer governments 
(to defend the status quo), including deterrence of forcible supply cuts by, and the 
application of sanctions against, select producer governments, but allows that this 
market structure also stimulates efforts by producer states to prevent price 
collapses.
Finally, a constructivist approach stresses the role of historical events in shifting 
the relative weight of legitimacy attached to different modes of behavior constitut-
ing “offensive” or “defensive” actions. Whereas post-World War II decolonization 
gradually elevated the importance of, and prevented the erosion of, Southern state 
sovereignty over territorial resources, later experiences with high infl ation rates, 
commodity price fl uctuations, excessive military spending, and “resource” confl ict, 
as well as corruption and NOC underinvestment in the energy sector, produced a 
different social knowledge that resource wealth can be a “curse” for its holders and 
should be held in trust for the benefi t of Third World populations (Ross 1999; Le 
Billon 2001; Birdsall & Subramanian 2004; Pegg 2006). The larger insight from 
constructivism is that divergent social understandings may account for Southern 
and Northern state behaviors that persist despite unfavorably altered material 
conditions.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The fi rst part surveys the aforementioned theo-
retical frameworks of inquiry into North–South energy-centric relations. It then 
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delineates the “trade cycle” for oil and explicates how its different phases (i.e., 
buyer’s vs. seller’s market conditions) account both for the occurrence of certain 
North–South energy-related confl ict types as well as limitations on the representa-
tive confl ict strategies in question. The last section explicitly addresses whether 
recent North–South energy trade problems represent a basic “reconfi guration” of 
passing divisions reminiscent of the 1970s or augur a “new confi guration” of inten-
sifying confl ict between established Northern importer–consumers and growing 




Energy-related trade confl ict lends itself to realist analysis in important respects. 
According to this school of thought, the anarchic structure of the international 
system, in which states remain fi nal arbiters of the ends they pursue and the means 
they apply, makes confl ict endemic. States defi ne the national interest to encompass 
both a necessary concern for survival, coterminous with territorial sovereignty, and 
an irreducible minimum of power to ensure survival (Waltz 1979). As states remain 
uncertain about each other’s intentions, their pursuit of power, even if only for 
security, results in a collective security dilemma (Jervis 1978).
Realism divides on whether states maximize security or power. Defensive realists 
posit that security can be attained at less than maximum power, notably when 
defensive means are advantageous to deploy relative to offensive ones (Glaser 1997). 
Offensive realists counter that, because all capabilities are inherently offensive, 
states seek security through hegemony, leading to counterbalancing and war 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 21, 34–6). Hegemony is particularly problematic for lesser 
powers because the preponderance of power that encompasses singular control over 
material resources to stabilize the world economy (Keohane 1984: 32) also permits 
predatory behavior (Snidal 1985: 585–90). For example, the Carter Doctrine, artic-
ulating a US prerogative to use force in the Persian Gulf region, is as consistent with 
denying territorial assets to competitors (Pape 2005: 30–2) as with preserving the 
egress of petroleum for the sake of the world economy.
Structural realists relegate specifi c motives behind confl ict to the unit level of 
analysis. However, as neoclassical realists contend (Layne 2006: 10–11) and Waltz 
(1959: 232–4) admits, specifi c confl icts have “effi cient” causes. Chronic material 
scarcity, not just scarcity of security inhering in anarchy, provides a key impetus 
for human aggression (Thayer 2000). Others root the drive to acquire more resources 
in the expanding consumption requirements of modern economies (Klare 2002: 
5–15) or, more particularly, in the American capitalist economy and its corollary 
“Open Door” requirements (Layne 2006: 7–10).
If resource shortages seem dire enough, major importing–consuming states 
face heightened motives to use military force to secure desired supplies against per-
ceived sources of blockage. For the United States, after the “peaking” of protected 
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domestic oil output and loss of spare capacity in 1970 (Mommer 2002: 152), incen-
tives grew to ensure fl ows of Persian Gulf oil. The American government, then trying 
to extricate troops from Vietnam and facing Soviet expansion of its Mediterranean 
naval fl eet and increased shipments of materiel to its Arab allies, responded to the 
1973–4 Arab oil embargo in part by threats of force (Knorr 1976: 236–7), backed 
by non-activated contingency plans for seizing Gulf oilfi elds (Alvarez 2004). The 
collapse of the Soviet counterbalance (Mitchell et al. 2001: 183–4) and a techno-
logical shift in favor of offensive means (Orme 1997–8) established the “permissive” 
context within which forecasts of rising imports of Persian Gulf oil (Klare 2004: 
74–8; Rutledge 2005: 141–4) and a post-2005 “peaking” in global oil output could 
be construed as precipitating the 1990–1 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq invasion (Peters 
2004; Deffeyes 2005: 9).
Conversely, other realist accounts do stress the ultima ratio nature of great-power 
interventions. Foreign military occupations must surmount large logistical hurdles 
and the nationalist resistance (Jervis 1978: 194–5; Le Billon 2001: 570) that prevails 
in many resource-rich areas of the Third World and that is bolstered by Southern 
commodity exporters’ dependence on high revenues. As suggested by Kuwaiti threats 
in early 1974 to detonate oil installations in the event of invasion (Knorr 1976: 
236), or by the notion that the value of capturing “upstream” assets can be degraded 
by otherwise weaker opponents’ efforts to obstruct “downstream” fl ows (Ross 
2004: 350), geographical advantages may favor smaller defenders (Glaser 1997: 
189).
Prospect theory
Developed to explain anomalies in expected-utility models of decision making, 
prospect theory serves as an adjunct to realism in accounting for core powers’ per-
sistence in losing military ventures on the periphery, the relative effi cacy of deter-
rence over compellance, preventive war and crisis escalation. It argues that deviations 
from optimal behavior stem from “reference point bias” (i.e., relating choices to 
salient expectations), “loss aversion” (striving to avoid losses rather than seeking 
gains), the “endowment effect” (overvaluing existing possessions), “renormaliza-
tion” (assimilating new acquisitions faster than perceived losses), and “risk accep-
tance” (taking risks to avoid certain losses, not to achieve probable gains) (Jervis 
1992, 2004; Levy 1997).
The relevance of this theory in the issue area of North–South energy relations 
relates to the supposition that, because leverage devolves on those facing losses, 
relatively more gradual emergence and longer duration of alternating phases in the 
“trade cycle” tend to favor “defensive” actions by the side attempting to limit 
reductions in their existing benefi ts. For example, multinational corporations’ uni-
lateral lowering of the “posted prices” of their Persian Gulf oil supplies during the 
buyer’s market conditions of the late 1950s galvanized formation of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960 (Skeet 1988: 17). Over the fol-
lowing decade, only at a gradual rate often lagging behind demand growth, did 
OPEC members obtain larger shares of returns from energy-sector FDI. Curtailment 
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of demand and export revenues after the 1982 and 1998 market slumps stimulated 
OPEC coordination with non-OPEC exporters in restricting output to shore up 
weak prices (Skeet 1988: 201; Mitchell et al. 2001: 166–9). Conversely, as a buyer’s 
market had become entrenched by the late 1980s, perceptions of Iraq’s “offensive” 
endeavor to raises prices via attacking Kuwait and expectations that it would sever 
more oil trade by invading Saudi Arabia and the UAE (United Arab Emirates) led 
to Northern states’ “defensive” use of force (Copeland 1996: 40).
Identifying reference points by which motivations for seemingly risky behavior 
can be ascertained remains problematic. Incentives exist to manipulate frames of 
reference to “make an identical situation seem different in terms of people being in 
the realm of gains in one and being in the realm of losses in the other” (Jervis 2004: 
172), as when OPEC countries linked their own post-August 1971 demands for 
higher “posted prices” and subsequent infl ation to the destabilizing efforts of earlier 
US suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold and its falling value (Penrose 
1976: 44, 46–7; Skeet 1988: 71–2; Venn 2002: 164). Moreover, motivated biases 
exist to evade responsibility for adverse changes. Attribution theory, implying that 
actors tend to blame confl ict on others and take credit for successful cooperation 
(Jervis 1992: 192), can account for Northern offi cials’ view that sellers’ markets 
refl ect deliberate exporter (in)action, rather than rising consumer demand (Venn 
2002: 161). Exporters have obverse incentives to attribute high prices to inadequate 
consumer-country refi ning capacity, which also limits Chinese crude imports (Ratliff 
2006), or to speculative activity that accompanies supply disruptions (Alster 
2006).
Social constructivism
Determining the relative defensibility of confl ictive actions requires insight into how 
historical experiences shape the institutional prevalence of specifi c reference points. 
Constructivist approaches argue that material resources acquire particular meanings 
only within larger social structures, which also consist of intersubjective knowledge 
and practices that (re)produce these structures (Wendt 1995: 73). Some constructiv-
ists concede “ontological priority” to “brute facts” over institutional ones (Wendt 
1999: 110), but others maintain that “[o]nly because of socially defi ned use 
do  .  .  .  raw materials constitute resources, which are also assets when they are con-
stituted in reference to immediate ends, or interests” (Onuf 1989: 285).
Post-World War II decolonization juxtaposed Southern states’ developmental 
aspirations against foreign corporate FDI and operational control in their hydro-
carbon sectors. Undergirded by rights to seek international arbitration of disputes, 
the concession system granted sovereign states rents, comprising royalties and taxes, 
while allowing companies to fi nd, produce, and sell oil, thus consolidating tacit 
cartel power, outside of the US market, in seven major MNCs (Mommer 2002: 99, 
118–25, 161). The norms and rules of the issue area were reproduced by corporate 
cartel practices of denying export markets for countries, such as Mexico (1938) and 
Iran (1951), which unilaterally exerted greater sovereignty over their oil industries 
(Kobrin 1985: 20–3).
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The cartelization of the market, as well as corporate derogration of social norms, 
as perceived in Esso’s (later Exxon’s) unilateral reduction in crude oil’s “posted 
price,” then the basis for calculating Gulf Arab governments’ fi scal take, inspired 
the 1960 creation of OPEC, “a nationalist response to an economic colonial-
ism  .  .  .  expressed in the concession system” (Skeet 1988: 222). OPEC’s charter text 
decried “the attitude  .  .  .  adopted by the Oil Companies in effecting price modifi ca-
tion” and exhorted member states to try to restore earlier pricing conditions and 
to stabilize prices through output regulation (ibid.: 246). The latter goal signalled 
an inchoate shared understanding among its founding members that OPEC should 
be a cartel, like that of the seven majors abroad and the Interstate Oil Compact 
Commission in the United States (Mommer 2002: 134–5). OPEC’s evident defen-
siveness lay in its inability to alter the extant buyer’s market.
Decades later, Southern control of territorial resources had become the prevailing 
norm. Despite evidence of fl agging sectoral productivity, key exporting states have 
tightly guarded power over resource production (Marcel 2006: 3), such that Western 
scholars were surprised that Venezuela would assent to the insertion of outside 
arbitration provisos into joint-venture contracts (Mommer 2002: 216–17). Norway 
was instrumental in getting the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, intended to open access 
to Russian reserves and pipelines, to include “Sovereignty over Energy Resources” 
(ibid.: 176–7), and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) leaves Mexico’s 
oil sector nationalized (Rutledge 2005: 99). Before the 2003 Iraq invasion, coalition 
authorities were admonished to minimize “risks of popular resentment of US neo-
colonialism leading to violence in the region” (Marcel & Mitchell 2003: 5). The 
“resource curse” concept (Ross 1999) forms the kernel of an alternative discourse, 
but using it to justify reversion to pre-1970s norms, rather than to guide efforts to 
organize transparent collection and popular distribution of revenue in post-confl ict 
locales (Le Billon 2005: 699; Hayes & Victor 2006: 347–8), risks more confl ict 
stemming from resistance to perceived sovereignty losses.
Sociopolitical Economy of the Energy “Trade Cycle”
In energy trade relations, scarcity of crucial raw materials relative to demand peri-
odically tilts leverage to the South. The related “product cycle” and “obsolescing 
bargain” concepts (Vernon 1971, 1980) partially elucidate this shift. While formal 
sovereignty and the locational immobility of extraction form latent bases for 
Southern state power, high risks and fi xed costs of exploratory mining operations 
compared to uncertain returns require concessions on royalty, taxation, and owner-
ship to entice MNCs to develop raw materials. However, with technological diffu-
sion, falling output costs, and rising dependence on energy revenues, as exemplifi ed 
by the fact that OPEC’s petroleum sales totalled nearly one-quarter of collective 
GDP and over four-fi fths of its aggregate export revenue by 1970 (OPEC 2005: 
13–15), host governments have fi rmer incentives to modify the terms of FDI (Vernon 
1971: 48).
In the product cycle, falling costs of technology and expertise lower prices by 
multiplying the number of producers, including Southern national oil companies 
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(NOCs). Consequently, only the residual need for MNCs’ marketing access would 
curb encroachment on their “upstream” assets (Vernon 1980: 521–2). Yet, Northern 
economies and oil demand expanded in the 1960s, and US imports of Middle East 
petroleum increased sharply after 1970 to compensate for the fall in domestic output 
and loss of spare capacity (Darmstadter & Landsberg 1976; Mommer 2002: 63–4, 
151). This allowed OPEC members to enlarge the extent of their control over 
“upstream” assets, turning their own NOCs into direct suppliers to oil MNCs and 
other large industrial consumers (Wilkins 1976: 174; Vernon 1977: 85–6), a trend 
underscored by the Saudi oil minister’s July 1971 remark that, “due to the coming 
energy shortages, a seller’s market had arrived” (Penrose 1976: 45). The obsolesc-
ing bargain implies, however, that softer markets redound to MNCs’ advantage 
(Vernon 1980: 523).
Until the Arab oil embargo following the 1973 October War, energy confl ict was 
mainly confi ned to “upstream” property holders (i.e., producer governments versus 
MNCs). The embargo, by which MNCs were forced to conform to Arab states’ 
destination restrictions, but could still blunt the boycott’s discriminatory intent by 
re-routing non-Arab supplies, further propelled NOC “participation” in MNC 
operations, already identifi ed as a key aim in the UN’s 1962 resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources and OPEC’s 1968 Declaratory Policy (Mommer 
2002: 146–60), to the logical end of nationalization (Marcel 2006: 28–9). Between 
1970 and 1980, OPEC NOCs’ average share of production increased from one-fi fth 
to nearly four-fi fths, while the majors’ fell from 72 to 17 percent (Venn 2002: 
44–5). As the boycott did more harm via its broader impact on all consumers, i.e., 
by subtracting 5 million daily barrels during its initial two months and shrinking 
world oil trade by 14 percent (Stoubagh 1976: 180), it placed Southern states and 
Northern populations in direct opposition to each other.
Thus, a “trade cycle” should also incorporate the role of consumer majorities in 
shaping Northern countries’ spectrum of responses to energy scarcity. Consumer 
countries that are asymmetrically vulnerable in an interdependent relationship face 
costlier response options (Keohane & Nye 2001: 9–17), regardless of whether these 
entail adjustment, burden sharing, or force. A seller’s energy market advantages 
“offensive” action and that by producing–exporting states. Given oil’s low short-
term demand elasticity (Rutledge 2005: 156), boycott-induced price hikes, which 
cost OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries 
$40–50 billion during 1973–4 (Skeet 1988: 103) while boosting OPEC’s “petrodol-
lar” yield from $6 billion to $107 billion during 1973–80, worsened infl ation, yet 
consumption did not fully fall off until energy-market deregulation allowed the 
1979–80 oil shock to register its full recessionary impact (Venn 2002: 138–9, 
156–7).
The near-term context of a seller’s market exacerbated by deliberate cutbacks or 
cutoffs may even present more salient countervailing imperatives for Northern 
governments to craft side deals and pursue group “dialogue” with key source states. 
Oil-consuming states embarked on this path during and after the 1973–4 Arab 
boycott (Skeet 1988: 106,118–21), similar to European responses to Russian 
Gazprom’s gas cutoff in January 2006 (Socor 2006c). Consumer countries in hege-
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monic position, such as the United States, have the greatest latitude to engage in 
“counteroffensive” action. America could even afford “inaction” in the form of 
price controls, which muffl ed signals to reduce post-1973 US consumption and 
infl ationary pressures (Ikenberry 1988: 100–1). The political clout of the US dollar 
has arguably exempted American consumers either from having to pay higher real 
prices for oil imports, via currency devaluation (Venn 2002: 160–1), or from having 
to factor the costs of projected military power into oil prices (Baker 2002: 144). 
Conversely, other OECD countries, even oil producer Britain, have levied higher 
end-use taxes (Baker 2002: 147; Mommer 2002: 191–2).
Nonetheless, the hegemonic consumer country qua hegemon has not entirely 
eschewed belligerency. West Europe and Japan had vastly more exposed positions, 
yet the United States was not immune to the effects of boycott, as Arab countries 
were supplying 20–25 percent of its oil imports, which accounted for one-third of 
its oil, during June–October 1973 (Darmstadter & Landsberg 1976: 21–2). US 
threats and voiced desires for OPEC’s “demise” fed a shared understanding among 
OPEC’s members that even consumer adjustment efforts, like the November 1974 
creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA), were confrontational (Skeet 
1988: 124–8). The IEA created mechanisms to coordinate stockpiling and release 
of supplies to cover OECD-country shortages, but with MNCs having lost OPEC-
area concessions, consumer-country activity, expressed in the IEA’s 1976 Long 
Term Program, centered mainly on altering market structure by lowering demand 
and increasing non-OPEC oil purchases (Keohane 1984: 217–40; Mommer 2002: 
170–1).
In the longer term, as the “obsolescing bargaining” model would expect, MNCs 
expanded to locations where offsetting compensation enticed them to undertake the 
costlier effort of extracting oil volumes that are smaller, more fragmented, deeper 
offshore, contained in landlocked areas, or more diffi cult to process. Private fi rms 
increased offshore drilling, which grew to one-third of oil production in 1995 
(Khadduri 1997: 136), extracted oil and built ancillary pipelines from the Caspian 
Sea region (Jaffe 2000: 150–2), and ventured into heavy-oil drilling in Canada and 
Venezuela (Deffeyes 2005: 99–108). These endeavors, in conjuction with recession, 
conservation, and development of alternative energy sources, reduced energy demand 
by 3 percent during 1979–83, with oil losing 10 percent of energy demand and 
OPEC losing the same share of total oil demand after 1973 (Mitchell et al. 2001: 
178). By 1983, OPEC had been relegated to “residual supplier” of a shrinking gap 
between falling demand and rising non-OPEC “baseload supply” (Stevens 1997: 
20), pressuring OPEC members to violate quotas and some even to court foreign 
investors (Mommer 2002: 172).
Later, concern in major consuming countries shifted to inadequate investment in 
state-run hydrocarbon fi rms. Because export revenue expansion tends to ratchet 
state spending on non-oil-sector items upwards more than revenue shrinkage compels 
budget cutbacks, producer–exporter governments have high discount rates, prefer-
ring to sell more oil than leaving it in the ground (Adelman 1995: 33). The idea 
that resource wealth brings the “curse” of skewed economic development, author-
itarianism, wasteful spending, rising external debt, and corruption (Ross 1999; Pegg 
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2006) is consonant with observations that rent-seeking dictators arm heavily for 
repression and warfare (Le Billon 2001: 566–8). Exemplifying this phenomenon, 
Iraq used its military capabilities and proximity to the world’s largest oil reserves 
to threaten enforcement of (neighbors’) OPEC quotas in the 1980s buyer’s market 
(Adelman 1995: 290), although the same market conditions impelled major con-
sumer countries to oppose Iraq, while also easing the economic burden, notably for 
the United States, of later sanctioning Iraq and certain other oil producers (Mitchell 
et al. 2001: 201).
However, as the “trade cycle” ascended again, rising dependence on Persian Gulf 
oil more sharply underscored the implications of underfunded OPEC oil sectors. 
Finding Gulf opportunities to invest in and book new reserves blocked by NOC 
monopolies or Northern government-led sanctions, energy MNCs turned to the 
Caspian region, but, with the historical experience of earlier expropriations, sought 
Northern offi cial guarantees of the integrity of FDI contracts via a pro-corporate 
“non-proprietorial fi scal regime” (Mommer 2002: 169) and a host of related devices, 
notably production-sharing agreements (PSAs), by which host regimes partake of 
profi ts only after MNC costs, which can be infl ated, are recouped (Rutledge 2005: 
184–5; Hildyard & Muttitt 2006: 54–5). However, Russian opposition to the ECT 
(Energy Charter Treaty) (Mommer 2002: 179), downward revision of estimates of 
Caspian reserves (Rutledge 2005: 117–19), and US-based MNCs’ dissatisfaction 
with sanctions (Klare 2004: 95–110; Holland 2006a) undergirded support for 
regime change elsewhere.
American consumer and corporate interests dovetailed in the post-1999 seller’s 
market. The latter was partially attributed to OPEC actions (NEPDG 2001: 1–12; 
Venn 2002: 58–60), and suspicions festered that the 2003 Iraq invasion represented 
an offensive to grab oil and weaken OPEC, backed by evidence that coalition over-
sight would envelop Iraq into the fold of neoliberal governance centered on PSAs 
backed by arbitration provisos (Hildyard & Muttitt 2006: 55–7). However, subna-
tional violence in post-invasion Iraq not only reduced US capacity to respond to 
turmoil in other oil-producing regions, but also boosted prices, thereby helping to 
reverse liberalization of hydrocarbon FDI everywhere in the South (Mouawad 
2006), weaken Northern trade sanctions, and lend greater credence to Southern 
threats to manipulate levels and destinations of supply (Stroupe 2006a, 2006b).
Market Infl uences on Types of North–South Energy Trade Confl ict
The construct discussed also provides a map of North–South energy confl icts that 
demarcate respective phases (i.e., buyer’s market and seller’s market) of the “trade 
cycle.” That is, different energy market conditions correspond to salient types of 
confl ictive actions, while movement along the cycle renders these actions more or 
less viable. Here, seven ideal types of confl ict, initiated by Southern producer–
exporters against Northern importing–consuming countries or vice versa, occur 
under fl uctuating market conditions that also determine the “defensive” or “offen-
sive” quality of the initial action (a slightly different use of this distinction is found 
in Ikenberry 1988: 16–19). While resource-related confl ict also occurs among 
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exporters as well as among consumers, interest in the above North–South juxtapo-
sition refl ects major consuming countries’ more salient need and greater potential 
ability to acquire supplies from the South. Thus, while the “trade cycle” strongly 
infl uences the issue-area balance of power, the consuming majors can more easily 
avail themselves of extraneous sources of counter-leverage to mitigate “sensitivity” 
and “vulnerability” interdependence (Keohane & Nye 2001: 9–17).
Energy “war” indicates threat or use of force by importing–consuming govern-
ments to challenge producer–exporter actions having adverse effects on customer-
preferred terms of energy trade. As the lower-left quadrant of Table 4.1 indicates, a 
defensive “energy war” is executed in a buyer’s market to forestall likely or impend-
ing supply cutoffs (see also Copeland 1996). If overall power is also less unbalanced 
(in favor of Northern countries), effi cacy of action is related to collective unity of 
relevant consuming states in the face of probable resistance by the target state or 
non-state opposition originating from within that state’s territorial boundaries.
Initiated by the United States and its allies Britain and France, the 1990–1 Desert 
Shield/Storm campaign is an exemplary counter-response to one target state’s (Iraq’s) 
forcible effort to resolve an inter-producer competition over market share that was 
suppressing already low prices.
Table 4.1 North–South energy trade confl ict
  Buyer’s  MARKET STRUCTURE  Seller’s
  ASSET/REVENUE ACCRUAL
Producer– Cartel creation and   Tax and royalty hikes
Exporter coordinated output   and expropriation to
 cuts to prop up prices  increase share of higher 
   asset values
   ENERGY CUTOFFS
INITIATOR   Sanctions on select 
(target is the   consumers
other actor)
  ASSET/REVENUE DENIAL
Importer– Sanctions on select exporters  Augmentation of MNC
Consumer   energy FDI privileges
  ENERGY WAR
 Deterrence of forcible  Compellance of supply 
 supply cuts   increases or stabilization
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While the cases involve less overtly belligerent uses of force, this category might 
be broadened to cover such actions as multilateral Persian Gulf naval protection, 
by the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, of Kuwaiti tanker traffi c 
from Iranian attack during the 1980s Iran–Iraq War as well as US military coop-
eration with amenable producer–exporter regimes, especially the FSU (former Soviet 
Union) Caspian Sea littoral states of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The latter coun-
tries numbered among those exporters registering uninterrupted average annual 
output increases since 1993 and 1995, respectively, even during the 1998 market 
downturn (BP 2006: 9), but continued to rely commensurably more on FDI and 
offi cial Northern assistance to surmount their multiple disadvantages of landlocked 
position, the late 1990s’ soft market, and (indirect target) Russia’s desire to constrict 
non-Russian routes of egress for Central Asian oil and gas (Klare 2002: 1–5, 
88–92).
In addition, a buyer’s market enables Northern actors, aligned with corporate 
and/or consumer interests, to undertake a defensive type of “asset/revenue denial” 
(also found in lower-left quadrant) – i.e., banning FDI in the energy sectors of 
sanctioned exporters and the latters’ global energy sales. A key factor heightening 
sanctions’ salient “defensive” quality, other than proximity to hostile acts by sanc-
tioned regimes, consists of concomitant enlargement of market share for the remain-
ing non-sanctioned producer–exporters (Luft 2005b). Their respective governments 
ordered or otherwise condoned boycotts by American or British MNCs of national-
ized Mexican and Iranian oil in the late 1930s and early 1950s, respectively (Wilkins 
1976: 164–5; Kobrin 1985: 20–3; Mommer 2002: 147), and during various over-
lapping periods commencing in the 1980s, the US government spearheaded sanc-
tions against Iraq and other countries, such as Iran, Libya, Myanmar, and Sudan 
(Mitchell et al. 2001: 201).
As prices rise, turning the “trade cycle” oscillation upwards, the discipline asso-
ciated with more nearly universal corporate and/or consumer willingness not to buy 
sanctioned assets and goods weakens. The US government failed in 1972–3 to 
prevent Libya from selling oil “stolen” via successive expropriations of British 
Petroleum assets and those of various American fi rms (Wilkins 1976: 169). Although 
a roughly 30 percent increase in mean annual oil prices between 1994 and 1996 
(BP 2006: 31) cannot explain US Congressional enactment of the 1995 Iran–Libya 
Sanctions Act, it may account in part for the growing proclivity of various actors, 
notably foreign investors, to circumvent UN sanctions against Iraq in the 1990–6 
period, as well as the gradual lifting of oil-export restrictions during the 1996–2003 
Oil for Food Program (see also Le Billon 2005: 692–4). As the vitiation of sanctions 
accelerated with the post-2001 strengthening of a seller’s market, burgeoning 
importers China, and, to a much lesser extent, India, began to apply a perceived 
“neo-mercantilist” strategy of proffering FDI, concessional loans, politico-diplo-
matic support, and arms supplies to secure equity positions in, and purchases from, 
various foreign energy sectors, even those of sanctioned countries like Iran, Myanmar, 
and Sudan (Shuja 2005; Sichor 2005; Perlez 2006).
On the other hand, the near-term context of a buyer’s market exacerbated by 
more extreme price drops should stimulate and favor a defensive strategy of “asset/
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revenue accrual” (upper-left quadrant) – in short, actions launched by producer–
exporters to organize cartels and coordinate output cuts, which diffusely target all 
consumer countries. Landmark cases include OPEC’s 1960 formation as well as the 
more widely coordinated and disciplined efforts to cap collective supply after the 
1982, 1986, and 1998 price downturns and later the 1986 and 1998 price collapses 
(Skeet 1988: 201; Mitchell et al. 2001: 166–9). As issue-area power now favors 
consumers, barriers to effective action depend on an unexpected degree of inter-
producer quota adherence. In practice, unity has either been enforced by a “swing” 
producer – an exporter like Saudi Arabia that holds suffi cient reserves and spare 
production capacity to allow it to pursue tactical overproduction in the strategic 
interest of reining in cheaters – or by one exporter’s use of force against another 
(Adelman 1995: 290; Claes 2001: 201–37).
Sustained ascent of the “trade cycle,” refl ecting real shortages or entrenched 
perceptions of greater scarcity trends, advantages “offensive” action in general, but 
offers relatively more leverage to producing–exporting states (thus inverting the 
buyer’s market situation). An overall balance of power that is less favorable to 
Northern countries further supports the issue-area confi guration of power. Consistent 
with the “obsolescing bargain,” the type of “asset/revenue accrual” indicated in the 
upper-right quadrant, encompassing tax and royalty hikes, retroactive fi nancial 
penalties on MNCs, and enlargement of national control over FDI to the extent of 
outright asset expropriation, reallocates more revenue and property to sovereign 
exporters. Moreover, these moves widen latitude to sanction consumer countries 
via “energy cuts” (see below).
Notable events include 1970–1 actions by Algeria and Libya. They could act 
forcefully sooner because their MNCs tended to be less diversifi ed, European demand 
for light crude had been rising, amplifi ed by reduced fl ow of Persian Gulf oil after 
the Suez Canal’s closure during the 1967 Arab oil embargo (Skeet 1988: 40, 46), 
and US and French offi cials preferred to avoid a response that would push Algeria 
into the Soviet orbit (Marcel 2006: 26). In 1970, aided by sabotage of the Saudi 
Tapline that crossed Syria to the Mediterranean, Libya halted operations of Shell 
and various US-based fi rms in order to compel them to raise posted prices and pay 
retroactive revenue, which was equivalent to increasing their tax rate to 55 percent, 
while Algeria nationalized Shell and Phillips assets and raised the tax-reference price 
on French output by 37 percent (Penrose 1976: 41; Skeet 1988: 58–61). 
“Demonstration” effects of these successes resulted in OPEC using the threat of 
embargo to foist price and tax increases on MNCs, in the 1971 Teheran and Tripoli 
agreements (Kobrin 1985: 24–5). Yet, “leapfrogging” by exporting sovereigns to 
better each other’s terms ratcheted up pressures on MNCs, resulting in Algeria’s 
1971 seizure of majority control of French fi rms, Libya’s expropriation of British 
Petroleum’s and other fi rms’ assets prior to October 1973, and OPEC member 
efforts to enlarge NOC “participation” in MNC operations, from 25 percent before 
the embargo to 60 percent in 1974, on the way to full nationalization (Skeet 1988: 
69–81; Marcel 2006: 28–9).
Analogous events recurred after 2003. Average prices of crude oil in OECD 
countries, increasing by one-fi fth between 2001 and 2003, rose by at least four-fi fths 
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between 2003 and 2005, while prices in the 2002–5 period increased by 42 percent 
for Japan’s LNG (liquefi ed natural gas) and by nearly four-fi fths for EU-area gas 
(BP 2006: 31), creating incentives for reversing more liberal FDI terms of the 1990s. 
Following the 2004 levy of back tax claims on private domestic fi rm Yukos that 
led to the forced sale of its assets to state-run Rosneft, Russian agencies leveled 
charges of ecological damage and cost overruns, widely regarded as tools for assert-
ing national control, against the TNK–BP Kovykta gas venture, Total’s Kharyaga 
oil holding, the ExxonMobil-led Sakhalin I oil project, and Russia’s only PSA, the 
Sakhalin II project, then comprising only of Shell, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi (MT 2004; 
Platts 2006b). Within a similar timeframe, Venezuela raised royalty rates on the 
heavy-oil joint ventures of ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, ConocoPhillips, Total, and 
Statoil, and tax rates on private conventional-oil pumping, assessed back tax penal-
ties on foreign fi rms, and enlarged the state’s shares in their various projects (AP 
2006; DJN 2006a; Forero 2006b).
Less likely candidate sovereigns to tighten the terms of energy transactions 
include landlocked countries. Nonetheless, in May 2006, after previously hiking 
royalty rates, Bolivia, backed by a dispatch of troops along with Venezuelan-assisted 
tax auditors to foreign plants and by estimates that costs to largest purchaser Brazil’s 
Petrobras of LNG imports could quadruple those of lost Bolivian supplies, demanded 
four-fi fths of gas output and revenues generated by Petrobras, British Gas, Total, 
and Spain’s Repsol, complementing this ultimatum by seeking to raise Petrobras’s 
contracted price (Forero 2006a; Platts 2006a, 2006c; Reel & Mufson 2006). Chad’s 
leadership employed back tax assessments and threatened Chevron and Malaysia’s 
Petronas with expulsion in the context of seeking a 60 percent share in the Chad–
Cameroon Pipeline (WSJE 2006), proceeds of which have been held in trust in 
exchange for World Bank loans (Polgreen 2006).
Related to the offensive type of “asset/revenue accrual” (also in the upper-right 
quadrant), “energy cutoffs” work to the extent that targeted consumer governments 
lack access to alternatives. In a position akin to that of Arab exporters in 1973, 
Gazprom- and Transneft-dominated trans-Russian pipeline networks, while afford-
ing a near monopsony on Central Asia’s westward energy exports (Olcott 2006: 
224–8; Socor 2006a), have served as levers, in the cases of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
the Ukraine, to impose steep gas price hikes on hitherto subsidized FSU importers 
(an effort undergirded by higher European market prices) in retaliation for perceived 
anti-Russian acts, or to procure “downstream” assets elsewhere in Europe (Torbakov 
2005, 2006; Kramer 2006a; Marples 2006; Socor 2006b). Gazprom has demanded 
European rates on supplies to Azerbaijan in order to undercut the latter’s shipment 
of its own gas through the South Caucasus Pipeline, which can be used to assist 
transit country Georgia and provide a trans-Turkey alternative conduit to Europe 
(Ismailzade 2006; Socor 2006d). To counter any West European consumer-country 
resistance to Gazprom’s efforts to acquire distribution networks in Europe, Russia 
has raised the prospect of diverting more energy supplies to Asia (Kramer 2006b).
While most oil is traded fungibly, numerous aspects of the growing energy trade 
with Asia could potentially establish a conducive basis for targeted supply squeezes. 
Venezuela’s concessionary and bartered energy sales to favored actors, its building 
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of a pipeline to Colombia’s Pacifi c coast, and cooperation in enhancing China’s 
capacity to refi ne heavier and sour crudes (DJN 2005; Hallinan 2006; Tu 2006) 
lend more credence to Venezuelan – and, in terms of the latter category of action, 
occasional Canadian – calls to sell more oil to China (Brinkley 2005; Luft 2005a). 
Other than affi liated “neo-mercantilist” and “resource nationalist” trends, factors 
based on a seller’s market that may restore pre-1973 levels of market infl exibility, 
making targeted diversions or cuts more feasible, include (Asian) expansion in the 
volume of long-term contracts for energy imports and shifts to non-dollar-denomi-
nated transactions (Pape 2005: 42; Rutledge 2005: 144; Stroupe 2006a, 2006b).
However, to the extent that these trends constrict the scope of the open market, 
they raise the probability of a more offensive type of “energy war” (lower-right 
quadrant) by importing countries seeking to compel sovereign exporters to increase 
or stabilize supply (this may also involve forcing Southern exporters to relinquish 
control over reserves to Northern fi rms, as indicated in offensive “asset/revenue 
denial” below). Actions of this type presuppose an offsetting imbalance of overall 
power in favor of consumer countries, so coercion may be countered only by poten-
tial subnational resistance in the targeted state. Operation Iraq Liberation in 2003 
approximates an executed example of this type of action, in contrast to dormant 
US plans to occupy Gulf states during the 1973 embargo.
Evidence for defi ning this endeavor as an offensive “energy war” is decidedly 
mixed, but it merits closer analysis. While motives related to Iraq’s resource base 
cannot be conclusively disentangled from each other or from other factors, and, if 
existing, were more likely aimed at facilitating corporate activities, a consumer-
oriented concern cannot be precluded entirely. The conjoined post-1999 contribu-
tions of OPEC output restraints and Chinese demand growth led to a seller’s market 
– prices fl uctuated but rose by 93 percent over the 1998–2002 period (BP 2006: 
31), yet trends in Iraq’s annual output, which increased slightly on average over the 
same period, should have attenuated this market structure. However, while average 
annual output and US-bound exports in the fi rst three years after the invasion were 
less than under the Oil for Food Program, a fact attributable to unabated infra-
structural sabotage, cross-monthly deviations in output and exports decreased in 
the post-invasion period (Williams 2006: 1078). Nonetheless, while preparations 
for invasion promoted expectations of future glut, resistance to occupation served 
to reinforce the inchoate seller’s market and may even have directly encouraged and 
enabled strategies consonant with “asset/revenue accrual.”
The offensive form of “asset/revenue denial” encompasses corporate efforts to 
increase and guarantee FDI values and may work in tandem with “energy war.” 
Examples of this include specifi c endeavors to create a wider space for the PSA form 
of FDI in Iraq itself (Holland 2006a, 2006b), but it could extend to include resource-
sector FDI backed by larger consumer-oriented Southern governments like China 
or Brazil. It is likely to encounter obstacles resembling those facing energy-centric 
“warfare,” primarily low-level opposition to privatization, its effects on revenue 
distribution, and corporate symbols of alien presence that forces stoppages of energy 
output or exports through violence against foreign installations and personnel, 
as in Bolivia, Ecuador, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia (Economist 2004; 
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Niazi 2005; Timmons 2005; AFP 2006; DJN 2006b; Marquardt 2006; Yardley 
2006).
Cyclical Patterns and Secular Trends in 
North–South Energy Trade Confl ict
The previous discussion lends itself to postulating that North–South energy trade 
confl ict experienced after 2003 matches a cyclical and temporary “reconfi guration” 
of divisions reminiscent of the 1970s “oil shocks.” This may also extend to encom-
pass the future of long-distance LNG transport centered on present and potential 
exporting areas, such as Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, 
Trinidad, and Venezuela. While spreading risk and covering the high fi xed costs of 
this undertaking favors initial North–South cooperation, little in the history of the 
oil and piped-gas trades guarantees against the recurring confl ict typical of mature 
markets, where a “gas-OPEC” and a swing producer like Qatar could act to set 
prices (Jaffe & Soligo 2006). Nonetheless, the view of trade confl ict patterns in 
terms of “reconfi guration” suggests that seller’s-market-related tensions will not 
permanently supersede basic economic complementarities.
Conversely, more pessimistic standpoints posit a “new confi guration” of inten-
sifying North–South confl ict in the context of supply depletion and rising consump-
tion by Southern exporters. Some hold that cumulative non-OPEC production of 
conventional oil, and possibly gas, are nearing “peaks” or maxima (Darley 2004; 
Peters 2004; Deffeyes 2005). Even the largest Persian Gulf onshore fi elds may be 
maturing (Luft 2003; Simmons 2005), and OPEC data show average daily crude 
output totals from Venezuela, Kuwait, Iran, Indonesia, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia 
having reached respective maxima in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1977, 1979, and 1980 
(OPEC 2005: 53–62). Indeed, given concern for wasteful practices, including gas 
fl aring, in which MNC operators seemed complicit, OPEC social knowledge of the 
developmental role of its oil supplies has contained at least a kernal of expressed 
interest in conservation (Skeet 1988: 49, 126; Simmons 2005: 49–52; Marcel 2006: 
26–7). Thus, the 1970s production cuts that Northern governments were likely to 
have construed as strategic (Skeet 1988: 50–1) may have refl ected real geophysical 
strains (Simmons 2005: 52). NOCs withhold fi eld-level data (Platts 2005), magnify-
ing uncertainty over whether proven reserves could be enlarged by new FDI (Maugeri 
2006: 152–155). This obscurity does not contradict the “resource curse” assump-
tion that offi cials have fewer incentives to invest in state-run energy sectors, nor is 
it inconsistent with motives to forestall precautionary consumer shifts to alterna-
tives. In the case of Russia, for example, subsidized domestic consumption require-
ments may have deprived Gazprom of needed revenues to replace reserves as well 
as worsened the domestic shortages that were externalized to Ukraine in early 2006 
(Victor 2006).
Warnings of impending supply downturns are legion, but if exporting states 
ratchet up consumption levels, confl ict-moderating North–South complementaries 
could diminish in the face of inter-consumer rivalries. This is presaged in the 
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example of China, which became a net oil importer in 1993 and imported just under 
half of its total supply in 2004, intensifying competition for supplies (Zweig & 
Jianhai 2005). However, if energy revenues successfully promote economic diversi-
fi cation, major Southern states would most readily be able to consume more of their 
own output (Peters 2004: 198–201). Revenues of over US$1.3 trillion and $400 
billion, respectively, for OPEC and Russia since 1998 (PIN 2006), instead of being 
as heavily recycled in the Northern banking sector as in the 1970s (Porter 2005), 
are also supporting oil stabilization funds, external debt retirement, currency reserve 
accumulation, and domestic business growth (Aris 2002; Mouawad 2005). While 
OPEC’s share of world refi ned products consumption rose only slightly between 
1973 and 2003, average OPEC products consumption as a fraction of its total crude 
output rose from 3 percent to over one-fi fth (OPEC 2005: 23, 29–31). OPEC 
members and Russia also consume most of their natural gas output, which may 
supply over 50 percent of the total Arab energy market by 2015 for environmental 
reasons (ENA 2005).
Policy implications associated with the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios 
diverge. Optimistic depictions of the energy “trade cycle” imply a tractably smooth 
pattern of oscillations, indicating that market conditions, which favor disparate 
degrees of confl ict, modes of action, and relevant initiating actors, tend to be self-
correcting, but less susceptible to purposive counter-action (Ikenberry 1988), includ-
ing unilateral exercises of military coercion. By contrast, Malthusian perspectives 
see an increasingly pronounced volatility in the “trade cycle,” refl ecting a conver-
gence of falling supply and rising demand trajectories that can be corrected only by 
more costly consumer-government responses, as suggested by the Iraq invasion or 
by recurring American appeals for a “Manhattan Project” to achieve energy inde-
pendence (Skeet 1988: 117; Layne 2006: 189), and as demonstrated by the Brazilian 
military government’s shepherding in the 1970s of what is now the world’s premier 
ethanol fuel production base (Martines-Filho et al. 2006).
The account here suggests directions for future research. For one, it necessitates 
more precise clarifi cation of the antecedent conditions determining where specifi c 
countries are located along the North–South spectrum (i.e., depending on the cir-
cumstances, countries like Canada, Norway, and Russia are analytically akin to 
“Southern” exporting sovereigns, while typically Southern states like Brazil, China, 
and India might identify more closely with “Northern” corporate and consumption 
interests). Moreover, the framework laid out here does not address whether, and 
the extent to which, certain actions associated with given market structures lead to 
confl ict because both sides understand that the actions aim to alter the status quo 
(which also favors other subsidiary actions by one side or the other) or because the 
changed status quo permits the pursuit, for unrelated ends, of action that itself 
engenders confl ict (i.e., consumer governments may oppose those price rises that 
allow enemy regimes to better arm themselves). Finally, in suggesting that “buyers’ 
markets” favor “defensive” actions, while “sellers’ markets” favor “offensive” ones, 
the treatment here does not fully specify whether the relevant property of the action 
hinges on motives or means, or whether, and to what extent, the proximity of 
response to market change also defi nes the “defensive” or “offensive” quality of 
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motives behind this response (e.g., defensively motivated actors cannot necessarily 
abjure the use of offensive force). Thus, we need more precise methods of determin-
ing, operationalizing, and measuring strength of motive as well as differentiating it 
from advantageousness of means.
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